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Abstract. Jon Elster suggested that even speakers who are not moved “by a 
concern for the common good”, but whose concerns are “purely self-interested”, 
may be still forced or induced “to substitute the language of impartial argument for 
the language of self-interest”. This substitution would be the fruit of the civilizing 
force of hypocrisy. This argumentative hypocrisy is a key concept for 
understanding a process of negotiation through persuasive strategies typical in 
constitutional debates. Particularly, Elster believes that “the most important 
requirement” of a bargaining theory should be “that we are able to specify what 
will happen during a temporary breakdown of cooperation”. The constituents can 
get out of an impasse caused by a non-cooperative situation resorting to 
argumentative hypocrisy. The paper will analyse some examples taken from the 
debate which led to the final version of the Italian Constitution.  
Keywords: Argumentation theory, Political argumentation, Rhetoric, 
Constitutional law, Elster. 
Sumário. Jon Elster tem sugerido que até os falantes que não são movidos “por 
uma preocupação com o bem comum”, e cujos interesses são puramente egoístas, 
podem ser obrigados ou induzidos a substituir a linguagem do egoísmo pela 
linguagem do argumento imparcial. Esta substituição seria o fruto da força 
civilizadora da hipocrisia. Esta hipocrisia argumentativa representa um conceito- 
chave para interpretar um processo de negociação por meio de estratégias 
persuasivas, típico dos debates constituintes. Em particular, Elster defende que o 
requisito mais relevante de uma teoria da negociação deveria ser o facto de ter a 
capacidade de explicar o que acontece no caso de uma suspensão temporária da 
cooperação. A hipocrisia argumentativa pode permitir aos constituintes 
ultrapassar um impasse. Este artigo irá analisar alguns exemplos retirados dos 
debates que conduziram à versão definitiva da Constituição Italiana.  
Palavras-chave: Teoria da argumentação, Argumentação política, Retórica, 
Direito constitucional, Elster. 
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In his Arguing and Bargaining, Jon Elster applies his argument from the 
civilizing force of hypocrisy to the analysis of two historical examples of 
constitution-making processes: the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 and the 
French revolutionary Assemblée Constituante (1789-1791) (Elster, 2000). As a 
source of impartiality, even if through a kind of deliberative heterogenesis of 
ends, the civilizing force of hypocrisy works as a powerful mechanism of 
mediation. In sum, even if used hypocritically, impartial arguments can lead to 
agreements based on general interest.  
In this paper, I will briefly describe Elster’s approach, underlining mainly 
its argumentative dimension. I will focus the analysis of the second paragraph on 
the double parallelism between, on the one hand, self-interested and impartial 
argumentation, and, on the other, “threat-based” and “warning-based” 
bargaining. In the third and the fourth paragraph I will present some examples, 
taken from the travaux preparatoires of the Italian Constituent Assembly 
(Assemblea Costituente, 1946/48), applying Elster’s model to them. I will also 
address the main issue of the choice between publicity and secrecy of debates. In 
the fifth, I will try to show correspondences and differences between Elster’s 
model and a debate in a real context, in particular from the point of view of the 
rhetorical dimension. 
1.  Elster on the “civilizing force of hypocrisy” 
According to Jon Elster, the process of constitution-making can be 
described resorting to two types of – in his words – “speech acts”: arguing and 
bargaining. The first type, based on “rational argumentation” is subject to 
“criteria of validity”. The second, based on “threats’ and promises”, is subject to 
“criteria of credibility”. Both types together form “the main vehicles by which the 
parties seek to reach agreement” (Elster, 2000, p. 372). 
Considering the “type” of arguments used in constitutional debates, Elster 
makes a broad reference to two general categories: consequentialist or 
deontological arguments. In the first case, the framers “appeal to overall 
efficiency”, while in the second “to individual rights”. This second type, that of 
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“right-based arguments”, seems to be more “impartial”, because “the rights are 
assigned to everybody” (Elster, 2000, p. 378).  
Elster notices also that “consequentialist” arguments can imply a certain 
amount of impartiality. However, the use of deontological arguments seems to be 
much more effective: “framers can go to great lengths to make it appear that a 
measure whose real justification is obviously utilitarian can also be defended in 
terms of rights” (Elster, 2000, p. 391). 
Taking into consideration the debates developed in two constituent 
processes – the Federal Convention in Philadelphia and the Assemblée 
Constituante in Paris from 1789 to 1791, Elster insists mainly on the role of 
rational argument in constituent decision-making, claiming that even the actors 
with “purely self-interested” concerns may be “forced or induced to substitute the 
language of impartial argument for the language of self-interest” – a kind of 
“substitution” that Elster attributes to what he calls “the civilizing force of 
hypocrisy” (Elster, 2000, p. 349). 
This consideration leads Elster to conclude that the two original 
Habermasian commitments to truth and impartiality can coexist with a strategic 
use of impartiality and sincerity. Even if the framers are not genuinely committed 
to these values, “they may find it in their interest to appear to be so committed”. 
In this case, “they engage (…) in strategic uses of purportedly non-strategic 
argument”. In other words, self-interested actors may try to “ground their claims 
in principle” when “their self-interest tells them to appeal to an impartial 
equivalent of self-interest”. This strategic function of “citing a general reason” 
has, according to Elster, an obviously persuasive goal, which is to increase the 
ability of the speaker to persuade others, and particularly, to persuade “the 
neutrals to agree” with him (Elster, 2000, pp. 405-409). 
Finally, a kind of “substitution”, analogous to that established in an 
argumentative context by the “civilizing force of hypocrisy”, can also be found in 
a bargaining context. In the same way in which they may substitute an impartial 
argument for a direct statement of their interest, strategic actors “may also find it 
useful to substitute truth claims for credibility claims”. In this case, “instead of 
making a threat whose efficacy depends on its perceived credibility, they may 
utter a warning that serves the same purpose and avoids the difficulties 
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associated with threats”. Indeed, according to Elster “warnings” are “factual 
equivalents” of a threat. Threats, “are statements about what the speaker will do”, 
while warnings are statements “about what will (or may) happen, independently 
of any actions taken by the speaker.” Thus, this substitution seems to be 
motivated by a strategic preference for (more persuasive) claims based on truth 
instead of (possibly less persuasive) claims based on credibility (Elster, 2000, p. 
415).1 The “substitution” seems to be based on the rhetorical dimension of 
verisimilitude. A reference to (supposedly true) factual consequence is used in 
order to increase the persuasiveness of a mere appeal to (subjective) credibility. 
Interestingly enough, this passage, which constitutes the argumentative 
side of the “civilizing force of hypocrisy” and which takes us from a sincere 
commitment to truth to a strategic sincerity, partly coincides with the 
Aristotelian definition of rhetorical discourse. In rhetoric, the possibility of the 
discourse being true is taken into consideration only as a means of persuasion: 
independently of the truthfulness of the premise or of the sincere commitment of 
the speaker to truth. What matters is the appearance of truth (Viano, 1955, p. 
284): the persuasion of the audience about the truth. In other words, the 
civilizing force of hypocrisy is, in its essence, based on a rhetorical move. 
If, as according to Elster, rational discussion is supposed to be based on “the 
power of the better argument”, then constitutional bargaining “rests on resources 
that can be used to make threats (and promises) credible” (Elster, 2000, p. 392). 
Referring to these resources, from the viewpoint of the distinction between “the 
role of rational argument” and “threat-based bargaining in collective decision 
making”, Elster explains that the paper focuses on “bargaining on the basis of 
extra-parliamentary resources, such as manpower and money” (Elster, 2000, p. 
348). In other contexts he also makes reference to “extra-political” or “extra-
constitutional” resources. 
2. The Italian Constituent Assembly 
                                                   
1 Whether these substitutions refer to a strategic use of argumentation or to a deceptive use of warnings is a question that – although 
relevant – is beyond the purposes of this paper. Both are examples, according to Elster, of “impartial equivalent of self-interest”. As 
far as the “impartial equivalent” is concerned, the parallelism is relevant from my viewpoint. Although there can be clear differences 
between the two strategies. 
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According to Elster, every constitution reflects not only the relative strength 
of the contending political forces within the Assembly, but also the political 
climate. 
The Italian Constituent Assembly (Assemblea Costituente) was elected in 
1946 (using proportional representation) with the first free and full elections in 
Italian history. The result of the election set up a balance between the main anti-
fascist parties, the centrist Christian Democrats (DC) on one side (which won 35 
percent of the vote) and the two leftist main parties on the other (the socialists of 
the PSI, with 21 percent of the vote, and the communists of the PCI, with 19 per 
cent). A third political position, the liberals, was also very influential even if 
numerically less significant (less than 10 per cent, adding together all the liberal 
parties). 
As for the political climate, the work of the Assembly was threatened by 
external and internal circumstances. Internally, there were the obvious tensions 
inherent in the anti-fascist parties belonging to different political traditions: the 
Christian democrats, the Social-Communists, and the Liberals. Externally, there 
was the risk of a political crisis leading to civil war and, eventually, to foreign 
intervention. However, the main external influences affecting the work of the 
Assembly were the relations between political parties in view of the political 
elections of 1948. In particular, in May 1947 the Prime Minister (Presidente del 
Consiglio) Alcide De Gasperi, general secretary of the Christian Democratic 
Party, drove the communists out of the government with the aim of forming a 
new government, without the extreme left and obtaining the full support of the 
government of the United States. Italy could have followed the path of Greece in 
1946-1947, with a bloody civil war and foreign intervention (Foot, 2003). 
However, De Gasperi and the general secretary of the Communist Party, Palmiro 
Togliatti, continued to collaborate even after May 1947, to draw up the 
Constitution. 
The work of the Italian Constituent Assembly lasted 18 months, from 1946 
to 1947 (with over 170 sittings). 
As Elster noticed, a fundamental aspect of the institution of a constituent 
assembly concerns its internal procedural rules. The following issues can arise: a) 
it must decide whether to proceed in closed sessions or open the debates to the 
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public; b) it may decide to create one or several subcommittees to prepare a draft 
of the constitution or to discuss special issues (Elster, 2000, p. 367). 
Regarding this problem, a main concern expressed by the communist trade 
union leader Giuseppe Di Vittorio was that the secrecy of the sessions of the 
constitutional commission would have finally excluded “the people” from the 
drafting of the new Constitution (Pombeni, 2016, p. 112).2 As a matter of fact, the 
Italian solution was a mixed one: the sessions of the Assembly were public, but 
those of the commissions were closed. Indeed, in order to organize the work of 
the Assembly, the task of drafting constitutional provisions was delegated to a 
“Constitutional Commission” of 75 deputies (also known as “the Commission of 
the 75”), divided into three sub-commissions, each one chaired by a deputy of one 
of the three main parties3. The first sub-commission, tasked with drafting 
constitutional articles on the “Rights and Obligations of the Citizens”, was chaired 
by the Christian Democrat deputy Umberto Tupini. The second and the third, on 
“Constitutional Organization of the State” and “Economic and Social 
Relationships”, were chaired by the communist Umberto Terracini and the 
socialist Gustavo Ghidini, respectively. Finally, a Committee of 18 deputies (the 
“Committee of the 18”) was given the task of writing an overall draft of the 
constitution, in accordance with the work of the three sub-commissions. 
Working in subcommittees made it possible to have preliminary votes that 
did not commit the delegates to premature decisions. From this viewpoint, Elster 
quotes Jean-Josepph Mounier, leader of the moderates in the Assemblée 
Constituante: according to him, the committees favour “cool reason and 
experience,” by detaching the members from everything that could stimulate 
their vanity and fear of disapproval. Particularly, in the case of closed sessions 
(such as in the Federal Convention) there is little risk of being prematurely locked 
into one opinion (Elster, 2000, p. 411). According to Elster, at the Federal 
                                                   
2 According to Di Vittorio, the “most negative aspect” of the work method used in the Constituent Assembly were precisely the “small 
committees” which tended to exclude the “large public” from the debates and, above all, from the decision making process.” It is 
necessary to note that the secretary of the Italian Communist Party took part in the debate in the commission and in the relative sub-
commissions, being one of protagonists of the constituent process - one of the few leaders who was directly involved in the debates 
and who was among the responsible for the organization of the Assembly. From this point of view, he acted in a pragmatic way, often 
driving his parliamentary group away from (potentially controversial) positions of principle or radical stances and towards both 
pragmatic positions and compromise solutions (Pombeni, 2016, p. 112). 
3 “The next aspect of the constitution of the Constituent Assembly concerns its internal procedural rules. The 
following issues can arise … It may decide to create one or several sub-committees to prepare a draft of the constitution 
or to discuss special issues” (Elster, 2000, p. 367). 
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Convention the fear was that the pride and vanity of the delegates, as well as 
pressure from their constituencies, might have prevented them from backing 
down from an opinion once they had expressed it (Elster, 2000, p. 386).  Another 
interesting effect of secrecy – Elster notes – is that of pushing the debates away 
from argument and towards bargaining (Elster, 2000, p. 386). Conversely, in 
public sessions (such as in the French Assemblée Constituante) there is stronger 
pressure against the expression of self-interest. A public setting encourages the 
use of pre-commitment through principle, with the larger audience serving as a 
resonance board for the claim and making it more difficult to back down (Elster, 
2000, p. 410). According to Elster,  
this difference between the two assemblies is reflected in the debates. Many of the 
debates at the Federal Convention were of high quality: remarkably free from cant 
and remarkably grounded in rational argument. By contrast, the discussions in the 
Assemblée Constituante were heavily tainted by rhetoric, demagoguery and 
overbidding. At the same time, the Convention was also a place where many hard 
bargains were driven, notably the deal between the slave holding and the commercial 
states (Elster, 2000, p. 411). 
According to Elster, a positive consequence of secrecy also allows the 
possibility for a participant in the debate to change his or her mind. This can help 
reach a more cooperative and reasonable context, in which every participant is 
not strongly committed to coherence due to the external pressure of public 
opinion. As Elster noted, “the pursuit of understanding” can also be “constrained 
by a commitment to truthfulness or sincerity” and, in a habermasian fashion, “the 
outward form of truthfulness is consistency”. However, while “a participant who 
is seen as choosing normative arguments à la carte … will often be viewed as 
insincere”, people “often modify their views by exposure to an argument.” Elster 
notes that “framers in both assemblies believed that a major virtue of rational 
deliberation was that of allowing this to happen” (Elster, 2000, p. 377).4 We may 
also say that a (not necessarily genuine) change of mind can be instrumental in 
reaching an agreement on fundamental issues. During the debates of the 
Commission of the 75 a general problem concerning the framework of the 
Constitution was presented with the so called Bozzi Motion [Ordine del giorno 
Bozzi], subscribed by, among the others, Giovanni Lombardi (PSI), Mario 
Cevolotto (Liberal), Amintore Fanfani (DC), Tomaso Perassi (Republican), Piero 
                                                   
4 “Nevertheless, genuine changes of mind can often be distinguished from opportunism. Explicit disavowal of one's earlier views, and 
attempts to remedy earlier decisions, would be one criterion. Claiming to be persuaded by normative arguments that are counter to 
one’s self-interest would be another. Although neither criterion is infallible, both can be helpful” (Elster, p. 2000, p. 377). 
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Calamandrei (Liberal-socialist) and Francesco M. Dominedò (DC).5 This motion 
committed the framers to write a Constitution as far as possible simple and clear, 
so that it would be comprehensible “for the entire people”, and limited to 
“essential norms” and “concrete dispositions”, and to abstain from stating 
“general programs” and political “desires”. Key leaders both of the Christian 
democrats (Giuseppe Dossetti and Costantino Mortati) and of the Communist 
Party (Togliatti) criticized the motion as “equivocal”, defending the 
programmatic character of the Constitution (Togliatti) and the freedom of the 
framers (Mortati). At this point, Fanfani (one of the main subscribers) withdrew 
from his initial position and partially agreed with Togliatti on the programmatic 
nature of a Constitution: a program which was not – in his words – a mere “hope”, 
but a clear “will”. Interestingly enough, this change of mind led to a major 
compromise on the motion, based on an ambiguous reformulation. The Motion 
was ultimately approved, but a vote declaration of Tupini opened the door to a 
more flexible interpretation of the text (Pombeni, 2016, pp. 206-208). Tupini’s 
vote declaration can also be considered a kind of hypocritical commitment and 
an “incompletely theorized agreement” (Sunstein, 2007), something that 
originates from conflicting opinions, but which nevertheless concludes with 
participants agreeing on a single outcome, but for different reasons (Mansbridge 
et al., 2010). We will come back to this issue infra. What is relevant to show here 
is that Fanfani’s (at least) partial change of mind would have been probably if not 
impossible, at least very difficult in a public plenary assembly. 
Generally speaking, it is possible to say that, in the Italian case, the joint 
process of the (closed) committees and of the (public) assembly favoured the 
drafting of a Constitution largely based on a set of political compromises. The 
main example of such a compromise is Article 7, which established a privileged 
status for the Church in the new Republic, including (with the approval of the 
communists) the Concordat between the Church and the fascist State, included 
in the “Lateran Pacts” (Patti Lateranensi) of 1929. Other compromises ended 
with the independence of the Constitutional Court – a defeat for the Communists 
– or the Christian Democratic retreat from a corporativist and regionalist model, 
which can be viewed as a victory of the liberals. One of the main Christian 
                                                   
5 The Motion had been presented by the liberal MP Aldo Bozzi on October 25, 1946. 
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Democratic defeats came when the final constitutional text no longer proclaimed 
the indissolubility of marriage (Einaudi, 1948, pp. 662-663). Thus, it may be 
interesting to take into consideration some examples of such “compromises” and 
compare them with Elster’s framework. 
3. The debate in the sub-commissions 
Analysing the debate in the commissions, we find many characteristics 
included in Elster’s model. First of all, we find a bargain conducted resorting to 
internal and external resources. Among the internal resources, we may find the 
use of logrolling or vote-trading, which is the practice of exchanging favours by 
reciprocal voting for each other’s proposed legislation.  
During the debate concerning the inclusion in the Constitution of the 
indissolubility of matrimony (strongly endorsed by the Christian democrats and 
equally strongly opposed by the left wing parties and some of the liberals) a first 
compromise was ultimately found, including in the provisional draft a definition 
of family as a “natural society”, and dropping any reference to the 
“indissolubility” of marriage. Also in this case, the agreement was reached by 
Togliatti (PCI) and Aldo Moro (DC) on the basis of a (strategically) ambiguous 
reformulation of the text. The expression “natural society”, indeed, allows for 
multiple interpretations, and the agreement was clearly on the level of the 
wording, and not on that of the (different) possible interpretations. 
When the text was submitted in the Commission of 75 for approval, 
Togliatti, following the previous agreement, gave instructions to the communist 
deputies about how to vote. According to this logrolling strategy, the Communists 
allocated their votes in a way that ultimately permitted the approval of the 
expression “natural society”. 
The debate on the issue of the definition of marriage was thus made difficult 
by the strong resistance of the Catholic MPs (Giorgio La Pira and Dossetti, 
particularly) who sensed that this issue was absolutely crucial. During the debate, 
the direct threat of withdrawing from the commission was substituted by the 
warning that it could cause a secession in the commission.  The Socialist Lelio 
Basso, in particular, warned the Christian Democrat MPs against causing a 
secession with what he interpreted as stubborn behaviour. A kind of substitution 
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of a threat with a warning, based, in this case, on “extra-parliamentary 
resources”6.  
However, these strategies where ultimately ineffective, and the final draft 
included both the definition of family as “natural society” and the indissolubility 
of marriage. The issue was finally solved by resorting to a strategic use of the rules 
of the Assembly. In the General Assembly, the last passage before the final 
approval of the article was the vote of the amendment presented by the socialist 
MP Umberto Grilli, who proposed again to eliminate the term “indissolubility”. 
Before voting, twenty deputies called for a secret ballot. This was quite an unusual 
demand, based however on the rules of the pre-fascist Chamber of Deputies, 
which the Constituent Assembly decided to adopt. Thanks to this strategic use of 
a pre-existing institutional framework, which reduced the influence of the parties 
(and also of public opinion) over the deputies, the indissolubility of marriage was 
not included in the Constitution. 
Considering the argument used, every party tried to use “impartial” 
arguments, even if of a different kind. We know that every party had strongly 
“egoistic” reasons, mainly related to the imminent electoral campaign. However, 
they substituted the language of impartial argument for the language of self-
interest. 
The debate on article 29 and the possibility of introducing the indissolubility 
of marriage also provides a good example from this point of view. Even if the 
Christian democrats MPs were convinced that this position was not simply 
related to Catholic doctrine, but was ultimately based on the very “nature” of 
marriage, they also felt that it should have been justified on the basis of 
“universalizable” arguments. For this reason, they made it clear that they were 
referring to marriage not as a sacrament (which was already recognized by the 
church as indissoluble), but as a legal institution. Thus, they presented 
philosophical, consequentialist (based on “the unity of family”), and even 
“scientific” reasons for defending its indissolubility. La Pira used a kind of “tu 
quoque” argument, suggesting that the communist’s opposition to the 
                                                   
6 Making reference to “extra-constitutional bargaining”, Elster notes that “one party may act on the assumption that the other will be 
unwilling to be seen as responsible for breaking off negotiations” and he gives a similar example: “during the debates over the Spanish 
constitution in 1978, the Union of the Democratic Center was accused ‘of breaking a painstakingly negotiated set of compromises’, 
leading to the withdrawal of the Socialist member on the subcommittee” (Elster, 2000, p. 394, and n. 223). 
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indissolubility of marriage was ultimately contradictory, considering that divorce 
was practically banned in the Soviet Union (Damele, 2016).  
This type of argument was somewhat common in the Assembly at the time. 
It was also used in its version of a kind of “impartial” use of the argument from 
authority, based on the appeal to someone who is mainly considered as a political 
authority by the adversary. As Mario Einaudi noticed, “the Communists called in 
the authority of George Washington and relied on Benjamin Franklin to weaken 
the argument for an upper chamber, while the Christian Democrats quoted at 
length the authority of Stalin to support the thesis that the two chambers had to 
be of equal power” (Einaudi, 1948, p. 662). This kind of use of the argument from 
authority can also be considered hypocritical, since it makes reference to 
somebody who, under normal circumstances, would not be considered a political 
or moral reference point by the speaker. In this case, the hypocritical nature of 
the argumentation is quite explicit. On the other hand, the appeal to someone 
who is regarded as a political authority by the adversary, increases the appearance 
of impartiality, for persuasive purposes. From Elster’s viewpoint, the speaker is 
not necessarily impartial: he exploits impartiality for self-interested purposes. 
Nevertheless, Elster thinks that even this self-interested use of impartiality can 
have a “civilizing” force, due to the fact that, in a sense, it speaks (even if for 
egoistic purposes) the language of universalizable arguments. 
Other examples show a strategic use of a hypocritical discourse, with the 
purpose of persuading different audiences. It can be interesting, from this 
viewpoint, to consider the different strategies used by Christian democrats MPs 
in order to justify their work in the Constituent Assembly towards their electorate 
and the Catholic hierarchy, and compare them with the persuasive techniques 
used by the same politicians within the commissions, in order to reach 
agreement. 
There was strong pressure, coming from the Vatican and the Catholic 
hierarchies, particularly on issues such as family, education and the role of the 
Catholic Church. In many cases, Catholic deputies tried to defend Catholic 
positions resorting to impartial arguments. Then, when this strategy was 
effective, they presented it as a victory for a Catholic point of view. This strategy 
was especially common during debates on social issues, when Christian Democrat 
Ethics, Politics & Society 
216 
 
deputies invited Communist and Socialist deputies to leave  aside terminological 
questions, and consider the essence of the problem, in order to reach a solution. 
However, when they had to defend their decision on articles published in the 
official press of the Catholic Church or of the Christian Democratic party, they 
presented that same solutions as purely based on the social doctrine of the 
Catholic church.  
Discussing the approval of the whole Constitution, in the Christian 
Democrat newspaper “Il Popolo”, La Pira (one of the leaders of the “left wing” of 
the Christian democrat party) stated that “it is possible to say, without errors, that 
the organic conception, typical of the Christian sociology … it is on the very base 
of this Constitution.”7 A kind of argument used with the aim of persuading the 
Catholic hierarchy about the acceptability (from their own viewpoint) of the 
Constitution. However, during the meetings of the Commission of the 75, La Pira, 
together with other Christian Democrat leading figures such as Dossetti and 
Moro, resorted to a different strategy, based on a universalization of the 
argument, with the aim of showing that, under the surface of different ideological 
and religious viewpoints, there was a deep common ground. Reference was made, 
for example, to a general evolution of the contemporary thinking, which resulted 
in a wide convergence between different ideological positions, on fundamental 
issues, such as, for example, labor law. In other words, on the one hand, the 
strategy was that of persuading the electorate and Catholic hierarchies 
(suspicious of the socialist and communist influence in the Constituent 
Assembly) that they were succeeding in drafting a constitution which was 
“Christian” in its fundamental inspiration. On the other hand, it was that of 
persuading political adversaries that, under different expressions, they all shared 
the same fundamental ideas. The objective of this double strategy was, 
fundamentally, a legitimation of the compromise, now represented as a strategic 
move necessary to obtain political success on issues that were instrumental from 
the point of view of Catholic social teaching (Pombeni, 2016, p. 117). Such a 
strategy can be considered, from Elster’s point of view, a good example of the 
civilizing force of hypocrisy: the necessity to reach an agreement force to 
“universalize” their own point of view (that is, to give an “impartial” version of a 
                                                   
7 Session of December 23, 1947 
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“partial” or “egoistic” point of view), only to come back to the original “partial” 
argument when the strategy is that of persuading the electorate or also, in the 
case of Christian Democrat MPs, the Catholic hierarchy. Clearly, in this second 
case, a kind of strategy like that used by the Commission, based on the idea of a 
deep common ground between different ideological points of view, would have 
been less effective, due to the position of the Catholic church (quite suspicious 
regarding “compromises” with the social-communists) or the polarization of the 
electorate.  
4. Conclusions 
The choice made by the constituent fathers to organize the Constituent 
Assembly’s work into two sessions – closed drafting commissions and a public 
plenary assembly – favored compromises, allowing, according to Elster’s scheme, 
shifts from arguing to bargaining and (in relevant cases) a change of mind or 
withdrawal. Many of the strategies  described by Elster as ways to (tacitly or 
expressly) reach agreement through negotiation can be found, such as logrolling 
or the strategic use of procedural rules in general. From a discursive point of view, 
examples of substitution both of impartial arguments for the language of self-
interest and warnings for direct threats can be found. Particularly relevant, from 
a rhetorical point of view, is the strategy used by the Christian Democrat MPs of 
using “partial” arguments while addressing their electorate or the Catholic 
hierarchies and “impartial” arguments in order to persuade their political 
adversaries – a  clear example of adaptation of the persuasive strategy to the 
(particular) audience.  
Many of these strategies can represent, from Elster’s point of view, examples 
of the “civilizing force of hypocrisy”, in as much as they imply a kind of 
universalization (mainly in the case of the substitution of the “impartial” for 
“partial” arguments) and the substitution of a subjective threat with an objective 
warning. Both strategies are, in the examples taken into consideration, 
instrumental to negotiation. 
It has become common to refer to the Italian Constitution as an example of 
“high-profile agreement”, different from the low profile compromises of the 
“politique politicienne”, which resulted in a process of “higher law making” (in 
Bruce Ackermann’s words). This is certainly true, due in part to the general 
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context and to the sense of responsibility of the “constituent fathers” (or at least 
of their leaders). First of all, the constituent fathers were well-aware of being in a 
kind of “veil of ignorance” situation. A crucial problem was that of the future 
electoral weight of each political party, something that suggested a solution based 
on a strong system of checks and balances, with the purpose of preventing the 
exploitation of a strong position, transforming an electoral advantage into a 
powerful domination of the whole system. Secondly, in a (highly) pluralistic 
political landscape, compromises are not only inevitable, but the desired result of 
the political (in this case constituent) process. Arguing, bargaining through 
threats and promises, are fundamental strategies instrumental to reaching such 
an agreement. However, it is also important to look, realistically, at the outcomes 
of such a strategy. We made a reference, supra, to Sunstein’s concept of 
“incompletely theorized agreement. This peculiar method of statute-making, 
aimed at reducing the potential for conflict, is based, according to Sunstein, on 
an agreement on abstractions, to which an agreement on the particular meaning 
of those abstractions does not correspond. 
Thus, ambiguity is used strategically to foster agreement on abstractions 
without limiting specific interpretations (Eisenberg, 1984). This technique, which 
according to Eisenberg corresponds to a “more rhetorical view of communicator 
as strategist”, is particularly used by collective agents like legislatures. In this 
context, people “confront multiple situational requirements, develop multiple 
and often conflicting goals, and respond with communicative strategies which do 
not always minimize ambiguity, but may nonetheless be effective” (Eisenberg, 
1984, pp. 227-238) 
As Hans Kelsen has noted, this exploitation of ambiguity can be part of a 
legislative technique which tends “to leave a large latitude to the authority 
charged with its application or interpretation” by “intentionally formulating the 
rules in a vague, indefinite, equivocal way” (Kelsen, 1939, p.11, 17). This choice of 
vague or indefinite terms seems to make the decision “easier when the interests 
are strongly opposed”. However, “the real concordance of wills” can be “only an 
illusion”, which is “very quickly dissipated when it becomes necessary to apply 
the norm formulated in indefinite terms”. Then, “it is realized that the … parties 
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have aimed at very different ends under the cover of the words with which the 
norm to be applied is expressed”. 
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